Tuesday, February 14, 2012

How to Export a Revolution. On State Terrorism and Iran


Since terrorism is in most of cases a financially very demanding enterprise, sooner or later the international community acknowledged that to limit and target efficiently the terrorist groups and activities it is absolutely necessary to target the private and state entities funding and harboring these groups and individuals.

This short research will try to analyze the existing legal framework and measures outlined to combat terrorism funding. In the second part it will categorize the various kinds of terrorist attacks, their possible targets and the various kinds of state-sponsored groups involved in them. These categories will be illustrated on the particular case of Iran.


Financing intelligence units, political assassinations, sabotages, guerilla fighters, insurgent groups, or, in a more recent and disputed terminology, terrorist groups on the enemy's territory proved in many cases a quite efficient way how to influence the political outcome of conflicts. Rulers and states resorted to this practice since the ancient times. Interfering in a rival or enemy state's internal affairs is, according to the supporters of realpolitik, a legitimate act, applied for self-defense or to enhance one's chances to weaken one's enemies and win a war. Sedition and spying has been described in ancient treaties on war, such as The Art of War, by the Chinese Sun Tzu (8th-5th century BC), the Arthashastra, by Chanakya (cca. 350-283 BC), the teacher of Chandragupta, the first Mauryan emperor of the Indian subcontinent, and maybe everybody knows the Caesarian quote “Divide et impera”, divide and conquer.

The difficulties to create a generally accepted definition of state-sponsored terrorism begin with the difficulty to define the word, or the act of “terrorism” itself. Probably most of the scholars would agree that terrorism is mainly used by relatively weak, non-state groups or actors who do not have the capability to build up a regular army and confront the ruling establishment of a country in a regular battle and overthrow it. In this case singular, but larger-scale attacks are carried out and civilian casualties are frequent or, in many cases directly seeked. In case the group is able to build up an armed unit and confront the army and security forces, usually the term militia or guerilla is used. But in both cases the main aspect is the fight of a usually minority group against a ruling establishment or a status quo and aiming to overthrow it or influence its policy, an attack “from below”. Since a state is a ruling entity and its actions are perceived as coming “from above”, terrorism perpetrated by a state can be perceived as such only in cases the state, or the state-sponsored actor happens to be in the same position – minority, disadvantaged position. And this happens mainly abroad, in a hostile environment which usually becomes the target of these violent acts.

The distinction based on this definition could be

  1. citizens of the sponsor state, mostly members of state organizations acting abroad on behalf of the state

  2. non-citizens of the sponsor state, local groups and individuals, re

    siding or acting in the country/region the sponsoring country tries to target or influence

In the first group the usual perpetrators are, or could be members or affiliates of the state’s security apparatus, armed forces, agents of intelligence services, diplomatic personnel and embassy employees, citizens deployed for various kinds of missions. These missions could encompass smuggling of weapons and other material, or direct orchestration, preparation, funding and supporting of terrorist attacks: targeted killings of uncomfortable individuals, bombings of strategic points either of military, political or ideological importance, eventually kidnapping or taking hostages.

The second category encompasses individuating like-minded minorities from the ethnical, political or religious point of view in the target country or region, radicalizing them, creating organized groups, training and arming them to fight against the enemy of the sponsor state. These kinds of organizations are often nicknamed as Fifth Columns, based on the events from the Spanish Civil War and the siege of Madrid.

An eventual third, very particular case of state-sponsored terrorism could be the so called “false flag” attacks. These kinds of attacks could be perpetrated in two ways, but the common aim of both of them is to induce an illusion of being under attack. It can be carried out as a real or simulated military attack of disguised agents at a border post, provoking an incident, shooting, even killing of some military personnel. Maybe the most famous is the staged attack of German soldiers in Polish uniforms against a radio station, known as the Gliwice incident which triggered the Second World War. The second way is a terrorist attack inside the country blamed on a specific group, nation state or other entity and may be somewhat controversial, because it can be used not only to declare war on another nation state, but also to tighten the security measures and repression inside.

In more definitions state-sponsored terrorism encompasses also acts of suppression and terror on the state's own citizens. The present author argues that this category should be taken out from the framework of state-sponsored terrorism with the only probably justifiable example of targeted killings of citizens (opposition leaders, officials, important dissident figures) or groups of them residing abroad. The main argument for the enclosure of these acts in the spectrum of terrorist acts (namely in the first group) is the international dimension of the operation, the security implications for another country, the possibility of harming bystanders and, of course, in general, taking a person's life in a violent manner in the framework of a country, which may, or may not be in state of war with the sponsor country. The main peril here is, that targeted killings, or extra-judicial executions of terrorists or terror suspects, have been defined as a legitimate self-defense by the Supreme Court of Israel (on Dec 14. 2006). The general acceptance of this rule could allow autocratic countries to eliminate opponents without investigation and a court sentence, in any country worldwide solely on base of vague terrorism charges, frequently without any real proof. On the other hand the argument for the elimination of terror and violence committed by the state on its own citizens comes from Weber's basic definition of state as holding monopoly on violence. An organization, which holds monopoly on violence is in strict opposition to the conception of terrorism as the movement of the weak, coming from below, indeed, the state is in most cases the target of terrorism and efforts to overthrow it. From this point of view terror and violence against the citizens should be considered an abuse of power, rather than an act of terrorism.

The Legal Framework

Even if terrorism and its international dimensions have been defined already before the second world war in the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism”, dated 1937, by the League of Nations, it has never been adopted by any significant number of countries. The issue became pressing in the late fifties, after a series of attacks against civilian planes and it led to the adoption of three conventions on the subject: the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

Other instances of terrorism, such as kidnappings, nuclear material security, bombings and the financing of these activities have been addressed only in the nineties by the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (1996), after the Lockerbie case which pointed towards the direct involvement of the Libyan government and the harboring of Al Qaeda fighters by the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. The Security Council, mainly after 2001 September 11, focused on the financing of terrorism and adopted a series of sanctions and obligations aimed to freeze terrorism-related assets and funds. Also two kinds of funds have been identified: legal and illegal. The legal consist of donations of privates and various charity organizations, those illegal are funds obtained from an activity violating national and international laws such as drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling or illegal arms trade.i A more detailed elaboration is the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted during its 4385th Meeting on 2001 September 28th.ii This Resolution also established the Counter Terrorism Committee.

For the first time the term “terrorist financing” appeared in theUN General Assembly's seminal Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in 1994.iii States considered to have links to acts of terrorism are Libya (1992), Sudan (1996) and the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1999 – expanded to include Al-Qaida in 2000 by resolution 1333) iv Iraq has been targeted in the resolutions 687, respectively 1441. Iran has been sanctioned by the U.S. After the hostage crisis in 1979 and its alleged involvement in the attack on the U.S. Marine base in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1984. The Resolution 1559 from 2004 has been adopted condemning foreign, mainly Iranian and Syrian presence in Lebanon. In the last years Pakistan is widely accused of harboring and financing mainly terrorist groups active in the Kashmir region.

The resolution 1269 mentions “terrorist financing”, but also by acts and omission such as sheltering, facilitating, funding, and failure to adopt reppressive measures, which is the task of state entities. Only states can shelter terrorists, while funding can originate from both state and private sector and not only direct financing can be viewed as “supporting” of terrorism. The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism states it clearly. Although financing is broadly perceived as a significant link between a state and the sponsored terrorist group, the financing state not necessarily controls every step of the organization. Despite the state responsibility, the customary law remains unclear, whether a member state's right to self-defense would arise under Art.51 of the UN Charter. The issue here is if the act of financing a terrorist group may, for the purposes of Art. 51, equate the terrorist group with the aiding state. Probably the only example could be the U.S.-lead war on Taliban.

The Ideology: How to Export a Revolution

In the late 1970's the rule of the last emperor of Iran, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi faced growing opposition from many strata of the society: communists and leftist intellectuals, right wing nationalists, bourgeoisie, merchants and a part of the Islamic clergy. After the Shah resigned and left the country, the Islamists, who ultimately took the reins of power, defeated all the other fellow opposition groups, left and right-wing and even other Islamic groups opposing the principle of Governance of the (Islamic) Jurist, created by Khomeini. The opponents have been executed, incarcerated and murdered, in Iran and abroad, where they fled persecution. The Success of the Revolution attracted some positive reaction abroad among the Islamic nations of the Third World. The idea of exporting the Iranian Revolution came from the leader of the victorious faction of it, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini. On many occasions he expressed this ideas and they have been gathered in a tiny book Sodour-e Enghelab az didgah-e Imam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini on Exportation of Revolution)v. In the preface to the English translation of it (the author at the moment of writing could not verify if it is present in the Persian original as well) there is an account of three possible ways of exporting the Islamic Revolution, and the fourth one, which is said to be of Khomeini.

The three visions are briefly the following:

The first was a passive, non-interventionist view, with virtually no active ambitions to export the revolution. It was concentrated on the prosperity of Iran only and aspiring to lead a conciliatory foreign policy, integrating Iran in the existing regional and global organizations and structures.

The second approach was radical and revolutionary, it viewed all official borders as products of the colonial era, called for their abolition and for violent overthrowing of the hostile nationalist, pro-Western or secular governments in the region. The final goal should have been a unification of the peoples under the flag of Islam.

The third approach was a combination of the first two. It strived to create a model Islamic society in Iran and at the same time “it contended that all revolutionary, legal or even violent, military methods had to be utilized in order to realize this aim. As for the world community the proponents of this perspective pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence concomitant with opportunism. They believed that wherever our national expedience and interest dictated, and the conditions were ripe, we could deal heavy blows to the dependent and autocratic regimes; if the conditions were not there, they would continue their policy of peaceful coexistence.”vi In the opinion of the present author, this description is probably the most fitting description of the current Iranian foreign policy. This “opportunism” and ambivalent attitude is in analyses frequently associated with the principle of taqqiya, or kitman in the Shi’a teachings. This principle, the dissimulation, even denial of one’s intentions and beliefs originated from the period when the Shi’a sect was forbidden and its members persecuted. Some analyst believe, that this principle is widely applied in Iran’s foreign policy, but it is quite disputed.

The fourth – quite idealistic – approach of Imam Khomeini is exposed in the book in a form of a compendium of his quotes and opinions expressed on other occasions. “The late Imam (S.A.) rejected as impossible and inappropriate the belief in a chain of revolutions through equipping and reinforcing guerrilla and underground groups, and through exhortation to setting bombs, staging assassinations and completely rejecting the existing regimes, which are unaware of the growth of popular movements.”vii It would consist of building an ideal society based on “noble” Islamic values, to serve as a model for other countries which would tend themselves to follow this example.

The general idea of the promotion of the Islamic Revolution in other countries on Iran’s expenses can be maybe summed up in this Khomeini’s quote:

The beloved people of Iran, who in the present era are truly the effulgent faces of Islam’s history, should try to accept the difficulties and hardships for the sake of God so that the high-ranking officials of the country would be able to accomplish their main task which is the promotion of Islam in the world.”

Sahif-e-ye Nour, Volume 21, p. 108, March 22, 1989viii

From the viewpoint of attacks staged or sponsored by Iran and its supported groups, it seems that Imam Khomeini’s opinion has not been followed, and the tendency towards military action and armed struggle gained much space in at least some of the ruling circles.

Apocalyptic beliefs and a vision of destruction

A particularly obscure religious sect, the Hojjatieh, engages the minds of many analysts who would like to highlight its apocalyptic beliefs and deep influence on the current ruling elite in Iran. Just for a short explanation: the Twelver Shi’a believe, that their last – twelfth – Imam Mahdi, a messianic figure, is gone into occultation and will come back at the end of times to rule in a better world. Some analysts believe, or want to believe, that this movement says that it is possible to hasten the arrival of Imam Mahdi, by escalating violence, triggering wars, killing many people and provoking chaos and bloodshed. Again this interpretation is very doubtful. Originally this group has been created during the last Shah’s rule to purge Islam from deviations, mainly Baha’ism and currently it is officially forbidden in Iran.ix

Iranian Organizations and Groups Accused of Financing and/or Supporting Terrorism

The IRGC – Guards of the Islamic Revolution, or Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, an mainly its Quds forcex are frequently connected with terrorism and supporting, arming, training and funding various militant and underground organizations in the neighboring countries. Except of a military organization, parallel to the conventional army, the IRGC is also one of the biggest owners of various industrial complexes and enterprises, banks and is one of the strongest and most important players in the country’s economy.

The Iranian intelligence apparatus is believed one of the strongest and it encompasses many operations against Iranian nationals worldwide. Until these days the dissent and opposition activists in Iran and abroad are closely monitored.

Foreign Terrorist or Militant Organizations Presumably Financed and/or Supported By Iran

In 2008, and surely she was not the only one who realized this after 2003, the analyst Barbara Slavin said: “There is no doubt that Iran's reach has increased considerably since 2001. Toppling Hussein and the Taliban eliminated Iran's worst enemies and allowed it to build on long-standing ties with Shiite co-religionists in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran has benefited from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute to forge new ties with Hamas and to deepen its relationship with Hezbollah.”xi
When we consider the nature and ideology of the new regime, established after the revolution in 1979, and the general socio-political pattern of the Middle East at that time, we can easily distinguish the places where Iran tried to gain influence and create affiliate groups and friendly regimes. Iran is an ethnically predominantly Persian, but, what is more important, the government, army and IRGC officials are all Shi'a Muslim of the particular “Twelver Shi'a” fraction which worships twelve Imams, historical religious leaders and in their opinion, the only legitimate heirs of Prophet Muhammad. One Christian and a Jewish Member of the Parliament are virtually of no importance. This religiously very homogenous society naturally looked first for countries or regions which had larger communities of people of the same religion. In places where they were not available, they addressed other sects, but still Muslim (Alawi, Ismaili, Sunni). And last, for political purposes they were able to put aside the limiting religious affiliations and built up alliances with countries religiously and culturally so different as the Communist North Corea, Lukashenko's Belarus, the leftist populist governments of Latin America, like Venezuela or Cuba.

Just months after the Iranian Revolution Saddam Hussein's army invaded the southern provinces and started the longest war of the 20th century, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). Even if Iraq, with its numerous Shi'a population would have been a good target for Iran, it proved fruitful only in the last years, after the fall of Saddam's regime. At the beginning of the eighties, Iraq was under the strong rule of Saddam, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on the East, so Iran was squeezed between hostile powers. Lebanon proved the most fruitful soil for their masterplans. Roughly 27% of the Lebanese are Shi’a and on the south the country has been confronted on various occasions with the power of Israel, an outpost of Western culture and military power in the Middle East. The Iranians found in Lebanon the most committed fighters for their cause.

Maybe the most well-known protégé organization is Hezbollah of Lebanon. Hezbollah حزب الله , which means in Arabic the Party of God, has been founded in the early eighties with the help of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, former Iranian ambassador to Syria and Lebanon and former Iranian interior minister. He said that “Hezbollah is part of the Iranian rulership; Hezbollah is a central component of the Iranian military and security establishment; the ties between Iran and Hezbollah are far greater than those between a revolutionary regime with a revolutionary party or organization outside its borders.xii Hezbollah's second most important commander, Sheik Naim al Qassem on the Iranian television said that Hezbollah acts under command of the Iranians in all military issues, including suicide bombings, rocket launches and other terrorist operations, and as their source of authority he named “al-wali al-faqih” (the ruling jurist) which is the title used by Khomeini and now by his successor Khamenei. Even the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah stated that Iran is supplying the group. The weapons used by Hizballah are mostly of Iranian origin and they are occasionally seized by mainly Israeli or Turkish security forces on their way to Lebanon by sea, air or land.

Just for illustration, the Hezbollah flagxiii and the IRGC (Revolutionary guards) logoxiv and a picture from 2006 from the Iranian Parliament full of these yellow flags.xv

In the last decade since the invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran has been accused more times of meddling in the internal affairs of these countries, undermining the security and gaining allies among local powerful groups and figures. All Sunni-majority countries accuse Iran of fomenting sectarian violence by the Shi’a minority, in the last months Bahrain, to a small extent Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main rival in the region. Saudi Arabia is very upset about the growing influence Iran has in the region and its nuclear program. It is also accused of helping the Syrian president Bashar Assad to suppress the opposition movementxvi, or also of paying people in cash to adhere to Shi’a sect.xvii

Iraq after the fall of Saddam is probably the best and most valuable target of Iran at the present time. The U.S. troops withdrawed only weeks ago and the still weak security apparatus of the new Iraq is not able to contain all Iran’s activities. Iraq has an estimated 65% Shi’a population and two of the most important Shi’a shrines, Najaf and Karbala, are located in Iran. Interestingly, in the same year as Hezbollah, in 1982, Iran created SCIRI, or Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It was initially led by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in exile in Iran and aimed at overthrowing Hussein’s regime. After the US-led invasion to Iraq and Saddam’s fall, Baqir al-Hakim returned to Iraq and led the movement until his assassination in 2003, until now unclear if carried out on orders of Zarqawi and the Sunni fraction or a rival Shia group. Than the leadership has been taken over by his brother Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, and finally, after his (natural) death by Ammar, his son. The underground movement became a legal party and its name has been changed to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and it became a very influential political party which run in the elections, until it lost the competition against Nouri Al-Maliki’s party. The armed wing of the party were the Badr Brigades, supported and armed by Iran, already since the Iran-Iraq war engaged in operations against Hussein and against the MEK or MKO, Mujahedeen-e Khalq, armed opposition group fighting against the Islamic regimexviii. After the fall of the regime, many of their members have been integrated into the new Iraqi armed forces, but they have been accused of violence against Sunni and other minority Iraqis.

The Mahdi Army of the cleric Muqtada As-Sadr has been accused of receiving Iranian aid, but the leading cleric says to be oficially opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq.xix

Iran is, or was, until some weeks ago, also the main supporter of the Hamas movement of Palestine. After the most recent events in Syria, when Hamas refused to back Bashar Assad’s regime against accusation of human rights abuses and killings of civilians, Iran cut its funding. Hamas complained that it didn’t have the necessary funds to pay the wages of the employees of the Palestinian Authority and in the last days it is urgently seeking a replacement for its main donor.xx

Acts of Terror perpetrated by Iran and by its proxies, alleged cases

In the past, the Iranian government carried out attacks on their arch-enemies abroad, usually dissidents and leaders of opposition groups. I should mainly mention the "Mykonos case". The attack happened on September 17, 1992 in Berlin's Mykonos restaurant and left four dead, Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fattah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan and their translator Nouri Dehkordi. To carry out the assassination, firearms with silencers were used, not a bomb. There were also other people in the rooms who were not targeted and survived the attack. Other attacks such as the assassination of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his aide Abdul Rahman Boroumandi in Paris in 1991, Kazem Rajavi from the MEK (Mujahedeen-e Khalq, an armed opposition organization listed as a terrorist organization in some countries), Prince Shahriar Shafiq (cousin of the late Shah) and many others. All were killed quietly by a firearm, or stabbed, and the murders were directly targeted at them without unnecessary loss of lives. Bomb as a weapon was used to murder Bijan Fazeli, son of a well-known actor and regime critic. It exploded in a Persian video store in London.xxi However, a bomb attack in a public place with many casualties to remove one person is not typical for Iranians. Just to mention a significant fact: many of these attacks have been directly perpetrated by Iranian nationals.

Other kinds of attacks involved mostly Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, its military wing, and were perpetrated by non-Iranian nationals. This has a very logical implication: in case the plot fails or the perpetrators are caught, Iran can distance itself from the attack. The main terrorist acts credited to Iran and Hezbollah are the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983, the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the bombing of Israeli embassy and Jewish center in Buenos Aires in 1994 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia 1996, even if the last one is frequently credited to Al Qaeda.

Some foreign nationals, most of them Americans, have been kidnapped, held hostage or killed by Hezbollah.

All these characteristics also point to a last plot blamed on Iran which is not very convincing: the alleged plot by Manssor Arbabsiar, an American citizen of Iranian origin to kill the Saudi Ambassador in Washington with the help of the Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel. The plot looks too unusual when compared to other Iran-orchestrated plots.xxii

The last kind of attacks, overtly perpetrated by Iran, are the attacks against foreign embassies. The siege of the US Embassy in 1979 ended up in a well-known hostage crisis when 52 members of the US embassy staff were held hostage for 444 days and a recent one from November 2011 against the British embassy which ended up in the departure of the British from Iran and expelling the Iranian diplomatic staff from UK. Various protest activities take place in front of various embassies in Iran, for example against the Muhammad cartoons in 2006.xxiii Despite the propaganda, that these protests are spontaneous, they are organized and have the approval of the security forces.xxiv


The research on Iran is not an easy task and it becomes very particular if we consider the ideology of the ruling establishment. To understand it really deeply it is not enough to apply the general schemes and rules of foreign policy and behavior usually applicable to other countries. To understand Iran it is necessary to understand its deeply intricate and heterogeneous ideological and religious structure, the Shi’a theology and the sectarian pattern of the Middle East. It is also necessary to understand the role of each of its strategic allies or “foreign branches”, which have a religious implication as well. Iran, side by side with the interest for hegemony in the broader Middle East region, built on a deeply rooted complex and memory of the ancient Persian empire, pursues a proselytizing revolutionary agenda, which is in many aspects similar to other political or ideological movements, like revolutionary communism, or extreme right wing militarist regimes, who during the history tried to find like-minded governments, export their ideology and expand their influence in the neighboring countries, frequently sponsoring hostile groups and influential individuals to undermine the current governments and provoke coups to install a puppet or a friendly government. The obtaining of financial means to pursue this kind of expensive foreign policy is also an important chapter to consider, mainly in the light of the efforts to manipulate the global prices of crude oil, still the main revenue for the government, despite sanctions. It might be supposed, that many verbal threats by the government are just aimed at raising the crude prices.

Another chapter is the government’s effort to silence the domestic and exiled opposition and control tightly the population.

Unfortunately the small scale of this paper does not permit us to analyze deeper the whole issue, but in general it is possible to assess the Iranian policy as a covertly militarist and expansionist one from its very essence. The government of the Islamic Republic does not refrain from financing militant groups and organizations and using them to support their aims in their complex and intricate foreign policy.

i Bantekas, Illias, “The International Law of Terrorist Financing,” The American Journal of International Law , Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 315-333, Published by: American Society of International Law, accessed January 23, 2012. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3100109

ii “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation”, UN Press Release SC/7185, dated 28/09/2001, accessed January 23, 2012. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm

iii GARes. 49/60, Annex II, op. paras. 4, 5 (Dec. 9, 1994);


“UN Action To Counter Terrorism”, UN website, accessed January 23, 2012. http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml


Hamid Tehrani, trans., Imam Khomeini (S.A.) on Exportation of Revolution. Tehran: International Affairs Department of the Institute for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini (S.A.), 2001.


Ibidem p. 16-17


Ibidem p. 19


Ibidem p. 67


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xvii O’Leary, Carole A. and Heras, Nicholas A., “Shiite Proselytizing in Northeastern Syria Will Destabilize a Post-Assad Syria”, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 35, September 15, 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38401


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xxii Hall, Eleanor, “ Ex-CIA Warns US ‘Dangerously Wrong’ on Iran, ABC News, updated October 12, 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-10-12/ex-cia-warns-us-dangerously-wrong-on-iran/3553704?section=world

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xxiv “Attack on UK Embassy in Iran ‘had Support of the State’”, BBC News UK, last modified December 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16010547

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