Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label terrorism. Show all posts

Friday, February 22, 2013

The MKO Case: Betting (Again) on the Wrong Horse in the Iran Regime Change

Policy Paper




            Abstract

On Semptember 28th, 2012, the US State Department delisted the Iranian organization MKO, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization from the list of terrorist organizations,[i][ii]following the Council of the European Union, which did so on January 26th, 2009. This paper will focus on the group’s history, background and presumable real intentions and will try to analyze why is this move a strategic error from the point of view of long-term perspectives in handling with Iran. In the second part other alternatives and some useful steps are proposed to face more effectively the regime in Iran. 


Keywords: Iran, MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCRI, Mujahedeen, Rajavi, terrorism, opposition, regime change, security, Islamism.




Introduction


            In the last years and especially since 2003 we witnessed a steady effort of the US, European countries and their allies to contain the suspect activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the nuclear field, sophisticated weapon production and arming & financing of militias abroad. The pressure on diplomatic level has been unsuccessful until now. Iran proved defiant against larger controlling attempts by the IAAE of all nuclear facilities, it refused to stop uranium enrichment and the hostile rhetoric and arming of militias targeting Israel and rival forces in the Middle East did not cease despite the recent sanctions.
It is not a secret that ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979 that degenerated into an Islamist take over, the US Government is seeking regime change in Iran, in some periods with an increasing intensity, mainly during the Bush administration. It is known that in 2006 the Congress spent at least $10 million in the framework of the Iran Freedom and Support Act[iii] (enacted September 30, 2006), in the following years even more ($75 million in 2007). According to Nicholas Burns, than undersecretary of state for political affairs, this budget has been mainly used to fund the broadcasting outlets Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty based in Prague with significant Persian departments.[iv] But others suggested that funds have been used to finance covert military operations on Iranian soil[v].
Recently (January 2013) a planned budget cut of $500 billions could cause the revocation of one of the aircraft carriers based in the Persian Gulf[vi]. But even if high scale operations might be halted, the continuity of a low-intensity warfare is not excluded.
One of the oldest military and political strategies to topple a government is to support its enemies. The European countries are much less prone to support adventurous regime change policies, with the few exceptions of countries, where they had direct interest (recently Libya could be classified as such). With Iran, Europe adopted a strategy of the “good cop”, trying to negotiate using diplomatic and economic pressure and refrained from explicitly advocating regime change[vii]. But the different stance of the US prepares a fertile ground for various opposition groups who claim to be able to bring about a change and install a friendly government.
These opposition groups have their own dynamics of getting the attention of policy makers which go further than the classical lobbying and promises of incentives and benefits as soon as they take over the country. Some of them use some other weapons, less morally acceptable, like emotional extortion by self-immolation of the members, misinformation campaigns, and … deception about its real goals.
One of these organizations, which presents itself as a “democratic alternative to the Iranian regime”, is the MKO, Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization.

In the present paper we will expose a deeper insight at the quite rich and interesting history of this organization, the reasons why it should not be trusted and finally why it shouldn’t be used against Iran. Other possibilities for dealing with it and with Iran itself will be outlined.
           




Who are the Mujahedeen?

          The People’s Mujahedeen Organisation of Iran (PMOI), also known as Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK) or Mujahedeen-e Khalq Organization (MKO), was founded in September 1965 by Mohammad Hanifnezhad, Saeed Mohsen and Asghar Badizadegan, graduates of Tehran University.[viii]. A “mujahid”  مجاهد , literally “fighter”, is a word from Arabic which assumed the meaning of a “warrior on the path of God”, a holy warrior. Its root is جهد jahada, striving, struggle, and it is the same as for جهاد jihad, the holy war for Islam.
The founding of the organization was the consequence of previous years of student activism against the Shah of Iran in the religious-nationalist movement and its affiliated Islamic Students Associations. The group subscribed to armed struggle because they considered peaceful resistance insufficient and lacked revolutionary ideas. These were based on their revolutionary interpretation of Islam’s Shi’a tradition of the martyrdom and resistance of Hossein, son of Ali, grandson of Muhammad, and an ideal classless Islamic society of order and justice paralleled to the then very popular revolutionary Marxist ideas. This mindset has seen a huge wave of popularity in those years with the works and ideas of Ali Shari’ati, Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Iqbal. Soon a group formed around the three leaders dedicated to study of religion, revolutionary theory and history when the strategic and theoretic bases of the movement have been created. The military training in urban guerilla warfare has been achieved when 13 members traveled to Jordan and Lebanon in 1970 to undergo it in the Palestinian Liberation Organization camps. The armed attacks were just in phase of preparation when a rival Marxist group, the Fadaeen-e Khalq Organization carried out an attack at a police station in Siahkal in Gilan province (February 8, 1971). During the next months prior to their own prepared attack, the group has been infiltrated by security agents and gradually arrested and put to trial for arms’ possession and studying subversive authors such as Marx or Che Guevara. The three founding and six other leading members have been executed. The last two members of the leading Central Committee, Masoud Rajavi and Bahman Bazargani have been sentenced to life imprisonment. The remaining members continued the struggle and performed attacks and armed operations. In 1975 an ideological dispute splitted the group in two and a new, purely Marxist group, the “Peykar” formed. This group rejected religion as incompatible with revolution.
The Iranian Revolution was a quite intricate phenomenon. At the beginning, religious, leftist, liberal and nationalist elements fought side by side to topple the Shah, but just days after the fall of the Shah’s regime, a bitter power struggle begun. The imprisoned Mujahedeen have been released and quickly established a network of local groups and armed militias very active between educated youth and students. Initially the MKO supported the leadership of Khomeini, but he mistrusted them and left them out of power. A ferocious struggle started between the MKO and the Islamic Republican Party, the IRP of Khomeini, which ultimately gained control over the country. MKO declared open struggle against the new Islamic government on June 20, 1981, after a large scale demonstration in Tehran and the major cities has been violently suppressed by the Revolutionary Guards leaving hundreds of dead and injured. The organization went underground, its leaders Rajavi and the ousted first post-revolutionary president Banisadr fled to Paris and the following attacks against Iranian authorities have been orchestrated from there. A National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI) has been formed, presenting itself as a democratic alternative to Iran’s new government and uniting more exiled intellectuals and opposition figures. The co-operation split up in a short time and since April 1984 the NCRI became a political wing, representing and lobbying for MEK in Europe and North America. In March 1985 Masoud Rajavi married Maryam Uzdanlu, who is until now the main leader of the organization, after Masoud Rajavi “went into hiding” in 2003 after the US invasion to Iraq. He hasn’t been spotted since, therefore some believe he may be dead or incapable of public appearance.
In 1986 the French government tried to normalize its relation to Iran and asked Rajavi to leave the country. The organization gradually relocated to Iraq, which was at war with Iran at that time (1980-1988) and created the National Liberation Army, NLA in camp Ashraf, a remote desert location north of Baghdad and some other minor locations. The members received military training and carried out attacks against Iranian forces hoping that they would make the Iranians turn against the Iranian regime which didn’t occur. The largest operation “Foroogh”, “Eternal light” took place even after Iran accepted the cease fire on July 18, 1988.
After the US & allies invasion to Iraq, the MEK have been first attacked, than disarmed and kept in Camp Ashraf, with a special place to house defectors from the group. They were under surveillance of the US and Bulgarian forces until 2009 when the control passed to the Iraqi forces. After the invasion in 2003 France suspected that the group would be willing to return to France, raided its French base and arrested a number of members. Subsequently some members and sympathizers immolated themselves in various European cities.
The new Iraqi government was very unwilling to keep the Iranians on Iraqi soil and various plans have been proposed to get rid of them. Allegedly a letter has been sent to the Americans from Tehran offering withdrawal of military backing of Hamas and Hezbollah and access to nuclear facilities in exchange for the group’s disbanding and extradition to Iran. The offer has been rejected.
The group is credited with the revelation of the Iranian nuclear program in 2002, but it is possible that this information were not obtained through another intelligence source. Mohamed El Baradej reportedly told that the information has been supplied by Mossad[ix].
On January 26th, 2009 the Council of the European Union and on September 28th, 2012 the US State Department removed the MKO from the list of foreign terrorist organizations after a long campaign of the Organization among top policy makers. The delisting also freed millions of dollars from the frozen assets of unknown provenience.


Terrorist acts and human rights issues


We should consider, why has the MKO been listed as a foreign terrorist group. One could believe that it was because of its attacks against Iranian forces, organizations and public figures. But the record is much more interesting. When we recall under which circumstances was the organization created.   

The MKO wasn’t fighting just against Iran. It helped Saddam Hussein to suppress the uprising of the Kurds in 1991 and ruthlessly massacred civilians in the town of Kifri. Maryam Rajavi is reported to have said “Take the Kurds under your tanks and save your bullets for the Revolutionary Guards”[x]. Anyway after the fall of Hussein, it quickly changed sides and joined the Coalition.
The organization has been created with a radical anti-imperialist agenda which resulted in many attacks against U.S. citizens and activities: the assassination of Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins in June 1973, U.S. Air Force officers Paul Scheffer and Jack Turner in May 1975, three Rockwell International employees in August 1976, Paul Grimm, a Texaco executive in December 1978 and finally in its active participation in the well-known US Embassy takeover and hostage crisis. After the official split between Khomeini and MEK the group went underground and carried out a series of bombings in Iran and abroad that killed high officials and ordinary citizens, in total cca. 10.000 people. In 1992 they carried out attacks on diplomatic buildings and personnel in ten countries including the attempted attack against the Iranian mission at the UN in New York. After the 9/11 attack the leadership hailed the operation and Masoud Rajavi reportedly told during the general gathering of the group one day after:

“If (Al Qaeda) could do such a sophisticated military operation we must be able to do so in a much better manner… wait and see the fruits of our revolutionary Islam” (Masoud Rajavi on September 12th 2001)[xi].

After the forced disarmament of the Iraq-based armed wing in 2003 the group apparently refrained from terrorist activities, and claims to be pro-democratic and secular, but the general lack of transparency in the organization does not exclude that suspect activities may continue and constitutes a source for legitimate doubt. The organization never published any detailed account neither about its rich and violent past, nor about switching ideologies and allies, or reasons for changing the personalities in its leadership. The group might be responsible of the recent terrorist attacks in Iran, aimed at military sites and crucial figures, namely nuclear scientists. Some of them have been killed in bombings or kidnapped and it is presumed that they might collaborate with the Israeli Mossad[xii].
At the moment the organization has multiple levels and branches. The main are the NLA – National Liberation Army, the now disarmed fighters in Iraq, the NCRI – National Council of Resistance of Iran, the political branch, active mainly in Washington D.C, Los Angeles, Paris and other minor locations managed by the supporter’s network. Their lobby approached some uninformed politicians, senators and MP’s of the US and European countries. Maryam Rajavi has been allowed to deliver speeches to some gullible MPs in the European Parliament and in the national parliaments of Estonia, Spain, Norway, Italy. In the Czech settings it was senator Jaromír Štětina who was approached by the MKO[xiii]. In the US the main supporters are Governor Howard Dean, Bill Richardson[xiv], Rudy Giuliani, General Hugh Shelton, Tom Ridge, Patrick Kennedy, Ted Poe, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. These officials have received tens of thousands of US dollars for standing up and speak in favor of the organization[xv]. In total the DC lobby firms have received over $1,5 million for a campaign in favor of MKO.
 These meetings and supporters have an immense value as a propaganda for its own members and supporters adding the organization some credibility and recognition.

The problem is that many officials accept the money, but also believe the propaganda of the MKO. Masoud Banisadr, a relative of the former president Abolhassan Banisard and an active member of the organization described the NCRI using these words:

 “Its main use was to deceive the Americans and Europeans against thinking of us as the same Mojahedin responsible for assassinating American citizens in Iran”[xvi].

            The organization operates a satellite television channel called Simaye Azadi (“The Image of Freedom”) and a long list of internet sites disguised as news outlets and activist sites advocating human rights. One of the most important is “ww.IranFocus.com”, “www.iran.mojahedin.org”, “www.iran-e-azad.org”, “www.iran-freedom.org”, “www.ncr-iran.org”, “www.mojahedin.org”, “www.maryam-rajavi.org”, “www.iran-democracy.com”, “www.isdciran.org” “www.nosratashraf.com” and the “Freedom Messenger” channel on most social networks like Facebook, Twitter, Youtube etc. Among the lobbying and pro-MKO groups there is the “Iran Policy Committee (IPC) “U.S. Foundation for Liberty”, “www.rajavisupporters.org” and many more[xvii]. The former spokesperson of MKO in the US, Alireza Jafarzadeh, has been promoted to the post of “independent analyst” on Iran for Fox News.
These media outlets air propaganda advocating the MKO’s removal from the list of terrorist organization (now successfully accomplished) and some unverified and exaggeratedly negative reports against the Iranian government with the aim of pushing the US and eventual allies to a war against Iran. The organization is credited to have revealed the Iranian nuclear program and some of its hidden research sites.
The organization’s support and sympathizer networks and cells spread around the world often act covertly and do not openly state their affiliation to the MEK. Their role is mainly fundraising, recruitment of new members, propaganda and illegal support activities like forging of identification documents, money laundering, etc.
            But the past terrorist activities are not the only concern regarding the organization. The organization has a long record of mistreatment of its members. As the reports published by Human Rights Watch and RAND, apart from volunteers, the members were recruited by deception from vulnerable groups of Iranian refugees and asylum seekers frequently in difficult situation and some kept in Iraq against their will.
The testimonies of a significant number of defectors who managed to escape offer a rare insight in the internal relations. The ex-members describe the organization as a manipulative personality cult similar to a religious sect based on a total submission and sacrifice of the member to the leaders[xviii]. Mainly in Iraq the members were kept in isolation from the external world, under strict supervision, with virtually no privacy, no personal life or communication with their families even within the camp itself. The family members who did not adhere to the organization were described as agents of the Iranian regime and the members were led to hate and despise them. They were subject to extensive brainwashing sessions, forced to humiliating public confessions about personal failures and shortcomings. The formerly married members were forced to divorce their partners as an act of total dedication to the cause. Sexual abuses have been reported as well. The members who expressed their will to leave were put in solitary confinement for months and even years, tortured and threatened by deportation to Iran. Some of them died under suspicious conditions. The leaders repeatedly threatened the members that they would be executed upon their arrival in Iran, but the will to leave the organization was even stronger than the fear from being extradited to Iran. In the last years even the Iranian authorities treated these defectors with clemency and accepted repenting members.[xix] [xx]Some of these defectors founded NGOs and societies such as the Nejat Society, Iran Interlink, or MKO Watch, to help them recover and document the human rights record of the MKO.

            The claims of the democratic principles is much less credible in this light and also the secularism of this cult is very questionable. The Rajavi couple are revered with a religious piety as the intermediaries between the people and god and religion plays an important role in controlling the members. The female members must observe the compulsory Islamic veiling. Personal lives of the members are tightly controlled, gender mingling is not allowed which makes it very similar to the current Iranian regime.

              The organization also lacks any evidence for its claims of a large supporter base inside Iran. The ideas of Islamism and Marxism, so attractive to the generation 30 years ago are now devoid of sense or discredited by the years of experience and evolution that affected Iran. The claims, that the organization underwent a democratic and secularizing phase are not credible enough for the Iranians and the human rights abuses in Camp Ashraf found their way to their ears through accounts of defectors. Probably the main issue of Iranians’ mistrust in the organization is its support for Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq war against Iran and the killing of Iranian soldiers. The group’s leaders are by most Iranians considered traitors and terrorists who under the guise of democracy just want to replace the current government by themselves with the help of anybody.

               The encouragement of defection from the group by the Coalition forces was not sufficient, and it is remarkable that the group’s forces disintegrate too slowly. It is presumed that most of the current members held in the Camp Liberty are being kept there by force or deception. Their relocation is extremely difficult due to the group’s desire to keep the armed wing alive and no reasonably acting country agrees to harbor them on their territory openly.

                Recently (February 9, 2013), attackers have shelled the Camp Liberty killing six and wounding about 200 people. An Iraqi wing of the Iran-backed Hezbollah claimed responsibility and warned that other such attacks will follow[xxi]. This shows a possible reaction of Iran to the delisting of the organization and the fact, that the Iranian government is still considering this group as a vital threat.

           

What is the alternative?

            The policy makers hardly agree what to do about Iran. Instead of the two main options, the military and the diplomatic one, the “third option” is frequently offered: encouraging of an internal change performed by Iranian opposition groups. But which are the groups that can be trusted?
The Iranian opposition is extremely fragmented and the various groups hostile or mistrustful to each other. Except the MKO the other large group is led by the son of the last Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. Even if he is the descendant of the last ruling dynasty, he is calling for free elections and a referendum, where the people could decide about the desired form of government, either republic, constitutional monarchy or other. The other groups and individuals are mostly secular and nationalist, some leftist, scattered between Europe, the US and Canada. The problem is to reach any agreement between these opposition groups and figures and to attract the people with a feasible program, because until now the groups could agree only on one thing: the removal of the Islamic Regime.   

              The most important in considering an organization worth support should be a thorough knowledge of its background. It should have a non-violent past and a constant secular democratic agenda. In the Iranian political spectrum there are much more trustful individuals and groups that can form a much more accomplished front.

 Iranians, after having suffered years under a religious dictatorship, gradually turned their back to extremist religion, just like communists who started to hate communism when they happened to experience it personally. From all the Middle Eastern countries Iranians are relatively one of the most educated, friendly and peaceful nations. Their diaspora is one of the largest, but also the most successful in questions of integration into the host societies, business activity and wealth. This is a great chance to exploit for a further co-operation if this question is faced sensitively. If the West will collaborate with the MKO or try to install it in case of government collapse in Iran, the vast majority will consider it a betrayal.

            The MKO and all its branches should be definitively disbanded and its history publicly exposed. Its members should be interviewed individually, the defectors should be allowed to leave the organization and placed in safe locations.
  

Is history repeating itself?


                 During a pro MKO assembly, Gov. Howard Dean, Chair, U.S. Democratic National Committee made a quite upsetting statement:

“Madame Rajavi does not sound like a terrorist to me, she sounds like a president and her organization should not be listed as a terrorist organization. We should be recognizing her as a president of Iran.”[xxii]

                 His words testify that the old practice of selecting and appointing “friendly dictators” in governing posts of conquered or satellite countries is not dead at all. At least it is apparently in conflict with any efforts of spreading democracy in the Middle East or anywhere.
It seems that the US administration also forgot the quite recent case of Ahmad Chalabi, the obscure self-proclaimed Iraqi opposition leader who lead the US-led coalition to an adventurous war with a still questionable results. Sometimes it is not clear enough if the US policy makers are just extremely forgetful or extremely gullible, or if they are just pursuing another plan, unknown to most of us. Iranians themselves, who are fond of conspiracy theories, are afraid that the Western allies might support separatist groups which would lead to a fragmentation of the territory between the Azeri Turks, Kurds and eventually other minorities and significantly weaken the country.

                After the US-led invasion to Iraq in 2003 reportedly Iran offered to comply with most requirements raised by the West in exchange for the disbanding and extradition of the MKO. Tehran offered to withdraw military support from Hamas and Hezbollah, help stabilize Iraq and grant access to its nuclear facilities. This offer has been rejected by Vice President Dick Cheney´s office[xxiii].
If the story proved to be real, we have to pose inevitably the question why should Washington refuse such a rare peace offer from Iran which furthermore complies with most of the requirements expressed by the West. What is the value of this group compared to the offer of talks?
                 It is not excluded that some members of the organization have been or could be recruited by intelligence agencies or Israel to perform in-country operations in Iran. Seymour Hersh in his article in the New Yorker from 2012, April 12[xxiv], suggests that in 2005, members of the MKO have undergone training by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the Nevada desert. The article suggests that MKO operatives under the supervision of Mossad have carried out the recent killings of scientists and attacks on nuclear facilities and pipelines in Iran.
                The delisting of the MKO should be only one of the first steps followed by a slow dissolution of Camp Liberty and an absorption of the group members into the secret operation units and their use against Iran.
                This would suggest a nice fusion between the first and the third option: leading into a war with Iran with the help of the worst possible opposition group[xxv].


Conclusion



              The de-listing of the organization implies also an exemption from justice for the past terrorist acts and human rights abuses perpetrated by the group, not only against Iranian, but also foreign citizens. It implies again a double standard in human rights and terrorism policies of the Western countries who opted without further investigation for the delisting of such an obscure organization with a violent past and a cult-like image. It implies the opportunism of both sides in the process of forming short time alliances.

The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend.

Just to conclude with some very appropriate words of Fatemeh Pakravan, wife of Hossein Pakravan, chief of the Shah’s security service from the time, when the MKO was emerging and carrying out its first bombings: “And he <Hossein Pakravan> […] used to say that, "If you use violence, you will meet violence. If these young people don't want to ... obtain whatever they want.... First of all, we never knew what they wanted. You see, they never said what they wanted. And we know very well in other countries, where people have said that they will kill, and put bombs, and go into terroristic actions, it's to obtain democracy, it's not true. We know that for a fact -- it's not true at all, it's to establish another ... a very, very bad dictatorship.”[xxvi]

             The US, Britain and France already interfered decisively more times in Iran’s history. The CIA coup against Mosaddeq is still a bitter memory and the secret support for Ayatollah Khomeini against the Shah which is now more publicized among Iranians is adding to the general mistrust. Another case of serious interference in Iran’s internal affairs will not leave the Iranian people indifferent. And it is not a wise idea to create a new enemy of 70 million with a diaspora of another twelve.







[i] Department of State, 2012. Federal Register, vol. 77, No. 193, Thursday October 4, 2012. [Public Notice 8049 and 8050 [pdf]. Washington D.C.: Department of State. Available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-10-04/pdf/2012-24505.pdf [Accessed 9 December 2012]. 

[ii] Runner, Ph., 2009. EU ministers drop Iran group from terror list. Eu observer  [internet] 26 Jan. Available at: http://euobserver.com/foreign/27472 [Accessed 12 December 2012].      

[iii]Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, HR 6198, 109th Cong., Congressional Record 152, (Pub.L. 109–293, p. 120 Stat. 1344, September 27, 2006). Available at: GPO Access, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-109publ293/html/PLAW-109publ293.htm  [Accessed 9 December 2012]. 
[iv] Wright, R., 2007. Iran On Guards Over U.S.Funds. Washington Post Online, [internet] 28 April. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042701668.html [Accessed 17 December 2012].

[v] Shipman, T. 2007. Bush sanctions 'black ops' against Iran. The Telegraph. [internet] 27  May. 
Available at:  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1552784/Bush-sanctions-black-ops-against-Iran.html [Accessed 08 February 2013].

[vi] Fox News, 2013. Pentagon to cut aircraft carrier presence in Persian Gulf to 1 due to budget strains. [internet] 6 February. 
Available at:  http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/06/pentagon-to-cut-aircraft-carrier-presence-in-persian-gulf-to-1-due-to-budget/#ixzz2LZrZPUJd [Accessed 08 February 2013].

[vii] RFE/RL, 2012. Hague Says U.K. Not Seeking Regime Change In Iran. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty Online, [internet] 15 October.
Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/hague-iran-regime-change/24740292.html [Accessed 19 December 2012].

[viii] Abrahamian, E., 1992. The Iranian Mojahedin; New Haven: Yale University Press, p.89.

[ix] Hersh, S. 2012. Our Men in Iran?. The New Yorker. [internet] April 6. Available at
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/04/mek.html [Accessed 10 December 2012].

[x] Rubin, E.. 2003.  The Cult of Rajavi. New York Times. [internet]13 July. Available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E4D6173DF930A25754C0A9659C8B63&scp=1&sq=The%20Cult%20of%20Rajavi&st=cse&pagewanted=4. [Accessed 17 December 2012].

[xi] Abdi, J. “Will Giuliani invite MEK “freedom fighters” to relocate in Manhattan?.”April 25, 2011, post on blog “NIAC inSight,” Washington insights for the Iranian-American community ,  http://www.niacinsight.com/2011/04/25/will-giuliani-invite-mek-%e2%80%9cfreedom-fighters%e2%80%9d-to-relocate-in-manhattan/

[xii] Daily Mail, 2012. Mossad training terrorists to kill Iran's nuclear scientists, U.S. officials claim... but is Israel's real target Obama?. Daily Mail Online. [internet] February 10. Available at:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2099142/Mossad-training-terrorists-kill-Irans-nuclear-scientists-U-S-officials-claim--Israels-real-target-Obama.html[Accessed 16 December 2012].

[xiii] Source withheld because of security reasons (Personal communication, fall 2012).

[xiv] Wilkie, Ch.,2011. Mujahideen-e Khalq: Former U.S. Officials Make Millions Advocating For Terrorist Organization. Huffington Post. [internet] 8 August. Available at:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/08/mek-lobbying_n_913233.html [Accessed 16 December 2012].

[xv] Al Jazeera, Inside Story Americas, “Has the MEK changed?” September 25, 2012
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestoryamericas/2012/09/20129256838561706.html

[xvi] Banisadr, M. 2004. Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel, London: Saqi Books, p. 219.

[xvii] MEKTerror, “Affiliate groups. MEK Members and Pressure Groups Mobilizing to Support the MEK”. NIACouncil Web site, http://www.niacouncil.org/site/PageServer?pagename=mek_affiliate_groups, [Accessed 16 December 2012].

[xviii] Al Jazeera, “The Cult of the Chameleon” October  17, 2007
http://www.youtube.com/watch?list=PL926BF9E7AD427F30&v=jDlNWErYCGw&feature=player_embedded, [Accessed 16 December 2012].

[xix] HRW, No Exit: Human Rights Abuses in the MEK camps. (Human Rights Watch. May 2005) Online.
Available at: http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/index.htm [Accessed 10 December 2012].
[xx] The RAND Corporation. The Mujahedin-e Khalq in Iraq. A Policy Conundrum. (Rand Corporation, 2009) Online. 
Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG871.pdf [Accessed 10 December 2012].

[xxi] Ghazi, Y. 2013. Six Killed in Shelling of Iranian Refugee Camp in Iraq. The New York Times. [internet] 9 February.  Available at:  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/10/world/middleeast/mortars-kill-several-in-a-refugee-camp-in-iraq.html?_r=0  [Accessed 10 February 2013].

[xxii] NIACouncil. Washington's Favorite Terrorists: Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, MKO, PMOI). Jul 6, 2011. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fWDoTfLxvEY[accessed  February 10, 2012].

[xxiii] BBC News, 2007. Washington 'snubbed Iran offer'. BBC News. . [internet] January 18. Available at:  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6274147.stm [Accessed 16 December 2012].
[xxiv] Hersh, S. 2012. Our Men in Iran?. The New Yorker. [internet] April 6. Available at
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/04/mek.html [Accessed 10 December 2012].

[xxv] Ekéus, R. & Braut-Hegghammer, M. 2012. Don't Go Baghdad on Tehran. How to Avoid Repeating the Iraq Debacle. Foreign Affairs. [internet] 18 October.
Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,11-1506-669.html
[Accessed 17 December 2012].

[xxvi] Fatemeh Pakravan, in an interview recorded by Habib Ladjevardi, 7 March 1983, Paris, France, Transcript 4 of 4, Iranian Oral History Collection, Harvard University.
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~iohp/pakravan4.html  [accessed  February 10, 2012].


Tuesday, February 14, 2012

How to Export a Revolution. On State Terrorism and Iran


Abstract

Since terrorism is in most of cases a financially very demanding enterprise, sooner or later the international community acknowledged that to limit and target efficiently the terrorist groups and activities it is absolutely necessary to target the private and state entities funding and harboring these groups and individuals.

This short research will try to analyze the existing legal framework and measures outlined to combat terrorism funding. In the second part it will categorize the various kinds of terrorist attacks, their possible targets and the various kinds of state-sponsored groups involved in them. These categories will be illustrated on the particular case of Iran.



Introduction



Financing intelligence units, political assassinations, sabotages, guerilla fighters, insurgent groups, or, in a more recent and disputed terminology, terrorist groups on the enemy's territory proved in many cases a quite efficient way how to influence the political outcome of conflicts. Rulers and states resorted to this practice since the ancient times. Interfering in a rival or enemy state's internal affairs is, according to the supporters of realpolitik, a legitimate act, applied for self-defense or to enhance one's chances to weaken one's enemies and win a war. Sedition and spying has been described in ancient treaties on war, such as The Art of War, by the Chinese Sun Tzu (8th-5th century BC), the Arthashastra, by Chanakya (cca. 350-283 BC), the teacher of Chandragupta, the first Mauryan emperor of the Indian subcontinent, and maybe everybody knows the Caesarian quote “Divide et impera”, divide and conquer.

The difficulties to create a generally accepted definition of state-sponsored terrorism begin with the difficulty to define the word, or the act of “terrorism” itself. Probably most of the scholars would agree that terrorism is mainly used by relatively weak, non-state groups or actors who do not have the capability to build up a regular army and confront the ruling establishment of a country in a regular battle and overthrow it. In this case singular, but larger-scale attacks are carried out and civilian casualties are frequent or, in many cases directly seeked. In case the group is able to build up an armed unit and confront the army and security forces, usually the term militia or guerilla is used. But in both cases the main aspect is the fight of a usually minority group against a ruling establishment or a status quo and aiming to overthrow it or influence its policy, an attack “from below”. Since a state is a ruling entity and its actions are perceived as coming “from above”, terrorism perpetrated by a state can be perceived as such only in cases the state, or the state-sponsored actor happens to be in the same position – minority, disadvantaged position. And this happens mainly abroad, in a hostile environment which usually becomes the target of these violent acts.

The distinction based on this definition could be

  1. citizens of the sponsor state, mostly members of state organizations acting abroad on behalf of the state

  2. non-citizens of the sponsor state, local groups and individuals, re

    siding or acting in the country/region the sponsoring country tries to target or influence

In the first group the usual perpetrators are, or could be members or affiliates of the state’s security apparatus, armed forces, agents of intelligence services, diplomatic personnel and embassy employees, citizens deployed for various kinds of missions. These missions could encompass smuggling of weapons and other material, or direct orchestration, preparation, funding and supporting of terrorist attacks: targeted killings of uncomfortable individuals, bombings of strategic points either of military, political or ideological importance, eventually kidnapping or taking hostages.

The second category encompasses individuating like-minded minorities from the ethnical, political or religious point of view in the target country or region, radicalizing them, creating organized groups, training and arming them to fight against the enemy of the sponsor state. These kinds of organizations are often nicknamed as Fifth Columns, based on the events from the Spanish Civil War and the siege of Madrid.

An eventual third, very particular case of state-sponsored terrorism could be the so called “false flag” attacks. These kinds of attacks could be perpetrated in two ways, but the common aim of both of them is to induce an illusion of being under attack. It can be carried out as a real or simulated military attack of disguised agents at a border post, provoking an incident, shooting, even killing of some military personnel. Maybe the most famous is the staged attack of German soldiers in Polish uniforms against a radio station, known as the Gliwice incident which triggered the Second World War. The second way is a terrorist attack inside the country blamed on a specific group, nation state or other entity and may be somewhat controversial, because it can be used not only to declare war on another nation state, but also to tighten the security measures and repression inside.


In more definitions state-sponsored terrorism encompasses also acts of suppression and terror on the state's own citizens. The present author argues that this category should be taken out from the framework of state-sponsored terrorism with the only probably justifiable example of targeted killings of citizens (opposition leaders, officials, important dissident figures) or groups of them residing abroad. The main argument for the enclosure of these acts in the spectrum of terrorist acts (namely in the first group) is the international dimension of the operation, the security implications for another country, the possibility of harming bystanders and, of course, in general, taking a person's life in a violent manner in the framework of a country, which may, or may not be in state of war with the sponsor country. The main peril here is, that targeted killings, or extra-judicial executions of terrorists or terror suspects, have been defined as a legitimate self-defense by the Supreme Court of Israel (on Dec 14. 2006). The general acceptance of this rule could allow autocratic countries to eliminate opponents without investigation and a court sentence, in any country worldwide solely on base of vague terrorism charges, frequently without any real proof. On the other hand the argument for the elimination of terror and violence committed by the state on its own citizens comes from Weber's basic definition of state as holding monopoly on violence. An organization, which holds monopoly on violence is in strict opposition to the conception of terrorism as the movement of the weak, coming from below, indeed, the state is in most cases the target of terrorism and efforts to overthrow it. From this point of view terror and violence against the citizens should be considered an abuse of power, rather than an act of terrorism.



The Legal Framework


Even if terrorism and its international dimensions have been defined already before the second world war in the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism”, dated 1937, by the League of Nations, it has never been adopted by any significant number of countries. The issue became pressing in the late fifties, after a series of attacks against civilian planes and it led to the adoption of three conventions on the subject: the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, and the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.

Other instances of terrorism, such as kidnappings, nuclear material security, bombings and the financing of these activities have been addressed only in the nineties by the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism (1996), after the Lockerbie case which pointed towards the direct involvement of the Libyan government and the harboring of Al Qaeda fighters by the Taliban regime of Afghanistan. The Security Council, mainly after 2001 September 11, focused on the financing of terrorism and adopted a series of sanctions and obligations aimed to freeze terrorism-related assets and funds. Also two kinds of funds have been identified: legal and illegal. The legal consist of donations of privates and various charity organizations, those illegal are funds obtained from an activity violating national and international laws such as drug trafficking, money laundering, smuggling or illegal arms trade.i A more detailed elaboration is the UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted during its 4385th Meeting on 2001 September 28th.ii This Resolution also established the Counter Terrorism Committee.

For the first time the term “terrorist financing” appeared in theUN General Assembly's seminal Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in 1994.iii States considered to have links to acts of terrorism are Libya (1992), Sudan (1996) and the Taliban rule in Afghanistan (1999 – expanded to include Al-Qaida in 2000 by resolution 1333) iv Iraq has been targeted in the resolutions 687, respectively 1441. Iran has been sanctioned by the U.S. After the hostage crisis in 1979 and its alleged involvement in the attack on the U.S. Marine base in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1984. The Resolution 1559 from 2004 has been adopted condemning foreign, mainly Iranian and Syrian presence in Lebanon. In the last years Pakistan is widely accused of harboring and financing mainly terrorist groups active in the Kashmir region.

The resolution 1269 mentions “terrorist financing”, but also by acts and omission such as sheltering, facilitating, funding, and failure to adopt reppressive measures, which is the task of state entities. Only states can shelter terrorists, while funding can originate from both state and private sector and not only direct financing can be viewed as “supporting” of terrorism. The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism states it clearly. Although financing is broadly perceived as a significant link between a state and the sponsored terrorist group, the financing state not necessarily controls every step of the organization. Despite the state responsibility, the customary law remains unclear, whether a member state's right to self-defense would arise under Art.51 of the UN Charter. The issue here is if the act of financing a terrorist group may, for the purposes of Art. 51, equate the terrorist group with the aiding state. Probably the only example could be the U.S.-lead war on Taliban.



The Ideology: How to Export a Revolution



In the late 1970's the rule of the last emperor of Iran, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi faced growing opposition from many strata of the society: communists and leftist intellectuals, right wing nationalists, bourgeoisie, merchants and a part of the Islamic clergy. After the Shah resigned and left the country, the Islamists, who ultimately took the reins of power, defeated all the other fellow opposition groups, left and right-wing and even other Islamic groups opposing the principle of Governance of the (Islamic) Jurist, created by Khomeini. The opponents have been executed, incarcerated and murdered, in Iran and abroad, where they fled persecution. The Success of the Revolution attracted some positive reaction abroad among the Islamic nations of the Third World. The idea of exporting the Iranian Revolution came from the leader of the victorious faction of it, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini. On many occasions he expressed this ideas and they have been gathered in a tiny book Sodour-e Enghelab az didgah-e Imam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini on Exportation of Revolution)v. In the preface to the English translation of it (the author at the moment of writing could not verify if it is present in the Persian original as well) there is an account of three possible ways of exporting the Islamic Revolution, and the fourth one, which is said to be of Khomeini.

The three visions are briefly the following:

The first was a passive, non-interventionist view, with virtually no active ambitions to export the revolution. It was concentrated on the prosperity of Iran only and aspiring to lead a conciliatory foreign policy, integrating Iran in the existing regional and global organizations and structures.

The second approach was radical and revolutionary, it viewed all official borders as products of the colonial era, called for their abolition and for violent overthrowing of the hostile nationalist, pro-Western or secular governments in the region. The final goal should have been a unification of the peoples under the flag of Islam.

The third approach was a combination of the first two. It strived to create a model Islamic society in Iran and at the same time “it contended that all revolutionary, legal or even violent, military methods had to be utilized in order to realize this aim. As for the world community the proponents of this perspective pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence concomitant with opportunism. They believed that wherever our national expedience and interest dictated, and the conditions were ripe, we could deal heavy blows to the dependent and autocratic regimes; if the conditions were not there, they would continue their policy of peaceful coexistence.”vi In the opinion of the present author, this description is probably the most fitting description of the current Iranian foreign policy. This “opportunism” and ambivalent attitude is in analyses frequently associated with the principle of taqqiya, or kitman in the Shi’a teachings. This principle, the dissimulation, even denial of one’s intentions and beliefs originated from the period when the Shi’a sect was forbidden and its members persecuted. Some analyst believe, that this principle is widely applied in Iran’s foreign policy, but it is quite disputed.


The fourth – quite idealistic – approach of Imam Khomeini is exposed in the book in a form of a compendium of his quotes and opinions expressed on other occasions. “The late Imam (S.A.) rejected as impossible and inappropriate the belief in a chain of revolutions through equipping and reinforcing guerrilla and underground groups, and through exhortation to setting bombs, staging assassinations and completely rejecting the existing regimes, which are unaware of the growth of popular movements.”vii It would consist of building an ideal society based on “noble” Islamic values, to serve as a model for other countries which would tend themselves to follow this example.

The general idea of the promotion of the Islamic Revolution in other countries on Iran’s expenses can be maybe summed up in this Khomeini’s quote:


The beloved people of Iran, who in the present era are truly the effulgent faces of Islam’s history, should try to accept the difficulties and hardships for the sake of God so that the high-ranking officials of the country would be able to accomplish their main task which is the promotion of Islam in the world.”

Sahif-e-ye Nour, Volume 21, p. 108, March 22, 1989viii


From the viewpoint of attacks staged or sponsored by Iran and its supported groups, it seems that Imam Khomeini’s opinion has not been followed, and the tendency towards military action and armed struggle gained much space in at least some of the ruling circles.



Apocalyptic beliefs and a vision of destruction



A particularly obscure religious sect, the Hojjatieh, engages the minds of many analysts who would like to highlight its apocalyptic beliefs and deep influence on the current ruling elite in Iran. Just for a short explanation: the Twelver Shi’a believe, that their last – twelfth – Imam Mahdi, a messianic figure, is gone into occultation and will come back at the end of times to rule in a better world. Some analysts believe, or want to believe, that this movement says that it is possible to hasten the arrival of Imam Mahdi, by escalating violence, triggering wars, killing many people and provoking chaos and bloodshed. Again this interpretation is very doubtful. Originally this group has been created during the last Shah’s rule to purge Islam from deviations, mainly Baha’ism and currently it is officially forbidden in Iran.ix



Iranian Organizations and Groups Accused of Financing and/or Supporting Terrorism


The IRGC – Guards of the Islamic Revolution, or Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, an mainly its Quds forcex are frequently connected with terrorism and supporting, arming, training and funding various militant and underground organizations in the neighboring countries. Except of a military organization, parallel to the conventional army, the IRGC is also one of the biggest owners of various industrial complexes and enterprises, banks and is one of the strongest and most important players in the country’s economy.

The Iranian intelligence apparatus is believed one of the strongest and it encompasses many operations against Iranian nationals worldwide. Until these days the dissent and opposition activists in Iran and abroad are closely monitored.




Foreign Terrorist or Militant Organizations Presumably Financed and/or Supported By Iran



In 2008, and surely she was not the only one who realized this after 2003, the analyst Barbara Slavin said: “There is no doubt that Iran's reach has increased considerably since 2001. Toppling Hussein and the Taliban eliminated Iran's worst enemies and allowed it to build on long-standing ties with Shiite co-religionists in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran has benefited from the failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute to forge new ties with Hamas and to deepen its relationship with Hezbollah.”xi
When we consider the nature and ideology of the new regime, established after the revolution in 1979, and the general socio-political pattern of the Middle East at that time, we can easily distinguish the places where Iran tried to gain influence and create affiliate groups and friendly regimes. Iran is an ethnically predominantly Persian, but, what is more important, the government, army and IRGC officials are all Shi'a Muslim of the particular “Twelver Shi'a” fraction which worships twelve Imams, historical religious leaders and in their opinion, the only legitimate heirs of Prophet Muhammad. One Christian and a Jewish Member of the Parliament are virtually of no importance. This religiously very homogenous society naturally looked first for countries or regions which had larger communities of people of the same religion. In places where they were not available, they addressed other sects, but still Muslim (Alawi, Ismaili, Sunni). And last, for political purposes they were able to put aside the limiting religious affiliations and built up alliances with countries religiously and culturally so different as the Communist North Corea, Lukashenko's Belarus, the leftist populist governments of Latin America, like Venezuela or Cuba.

Just months after the Iranian Revolution Saddam Hussein's army invaded the southern provinces and started the longest war of the 20th century, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). Even if Iraq, with its numerous Shi'a population would have been a good target for Iran, it proved fruitful only in the last years, after the fall of Saddam's regime. At the beginning of the eighties, Iraq was under the strong rule of Saddam, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on the East, so Iran was squeezed between hostile powers. Lebanon proved the most fruitful soil for their masterplans. Roughly 27% of the Lebanese are Shi’a and on the south the country has been confronted on various occasions with the power of Israel, an outpost of Western culture and military power in the Middle East. The Iranians found in Lebanon the most committed fighters for their cause.


Maybe the most well-known protégé organization is Hezbollah of Lebanon. Hezbollah حزب الله , which means in Arabic the Party of God, has been founded in the early eighties with the help of Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, former Iranian ambassador to Syria and Lebanon and former Iranian interior minister. He said that “Hezbollah is part of the Iranian rulership; Hezbollah is a central component of the Iranian military and security establishment; the ties between Iran and Hezbollah are far greater than those between a revolutionary regime with a revolutionary party or organization outside its borders.xii Hezbollah's second most important commander, Sheik Naim al Qassem on the Iranian television said that Hezbollah acts under command of the Iranians in all military issues, including suicide bombings, rocket launches and other terrorist operations, and as their source of authority he named “al-wali al-faqih” (the ruling jurist) which is the title used by Khomeini and now by his successor Khamenei. Even the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah stated that Iran is supplying the group. The weapons used by Hizballah are mostly of Iranian origin and they are occasionally seized by mainly Israeli or Turkish security forces on their way to Lebanon by sea, air or land.

Just for illustration, the Hezbollah flagxiii and the IRGC (Revolutionary guards) logoxiv and a picture from 2006 from the Iranian Parliament full of these yellow flags.xv






In the last decade since the invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran has been accused more times of meddling in the internal affairs of these countries, undermining the security and gaining allies among local powerful groups and figures. All Sunni-majority countries accuse Iran of fomenting sectarian violence by the Shi’a minority, in the last months Bahrain, to a small extent Yemen and Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main rival in the region. Saudi Arabia is very upset about the growing influence Iran has in the region and its nuclear program. It is also accused of helping the Syrian president Bashar Assad to suppress the opposition movementxvi, or also of paying people in cash to adhere to Shi’a sect.xvii


Iraq after the fall of Saddam is probably the best and most valuable target of Iran at the present time. The U.S. troops withdrawed only weeks ago and the still weak security apparatus of the new Iraq is not able to contain all Iran’s activities. Iraq has an estimated 65% Shi’a population and two of the most important Shi’a shrines, Najaf and Karbala, are located in Iran. Interestingly, in the same year as Hezbollah, in 1982, Iran created SCIRI, or Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It was initially led by Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim in exile in Iran and aimed at overthrowing Hussein’s regime. After the US-led invasion to Iraq and Saddam’s fall, Baqir al-Hakim returned to Iraq and led the movement until his assassination in 2003, until now unclear if carried out on orders of Zarqawi and the Sunni fraction or a rival Shia group. Than the leadership has been taken over by his brother Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim, and finally, after his (natural) death by Ammar, his son. The underground movement became a legal party and its name has been changed to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and it became a very influential political party which run in the elections, until it lost the competition against Nouri Al-Maliki’s party. The armed wing of the party were the Badr Brigades, supported and armed by Iran, already since the Iran-Iraq war engaged in operations against Hussein and against the MEK or MKO, Mujahedeen-e Khalq, armed opposition group fighting against the Islamic regimexviii. After the fall of the regime, many of their members have been integrated into the new Iraqi armed forces, but they have been accused of violence against Sunni and other minority Iraqis.

The Mahdi Army of the cleric Muqtada As-Sadr has been accused of receiving Iranian aid, but the leading cleric says to be oficially opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq.xix


Iran is, or was, until some weeks ago, also the main supporter of the Hamas movement of Palestine. After the most recent events in Syria, when Hamas refused to back Bashar Assad’s regime against accusation of human rights abuses and killings of civilians, Iran cut its funding. Hamas complained that it didn’t have the necessary funds to pay the wages of the employees of the Palestinian Authority and in the last days it is urgently seeking a replacement for its main donor.xx



Acts of Terror perpetrated by Iran and by its proxies, alleged cases



In the past, the Iranian government carried out attacks on their arch-enemies abroad, usually dissidents and leaders of opposition groups. I should mainly mention the "Mykonos case". The attack happened on September 17, 1992 in Berlin's Mykonos restaurant and left four dead, Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fattah Abdoli, Homayoun Ardalan and their translator Nouri Dehkordi. To carry out the assassination, firearms with silencers were used, not a bomb. There were also other people in the rooms who were not targeted and survived the attack. Other attacks such as the assassination of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and his aide Abdul Rahman Boroumandi in Paris in 1991, Kazem Rajavi from the MEK (Mujahedeen-e Khalq, an armed opposition organization listed as a terrorist organization in some countries), Prince Shahriar Shafiq (cousin of the late Shah) and many others. All were killed quietly by a firearm, or stabbed, and the murders were directly targeted at them without unnecessary loss of lives. Bomb as a weapon was used to murder Bijan Fazeli, son of a well-known actor and regime critic. It exploded in a Persian video store in London.xxi However, a bomb attack in a public place with many casualties to remove one person is not typical for Iranians. Just to mention a significant fact: many of these attacks have been directly perpetrated by Iranian nationals.

Other kinds of attacks involved mostly Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, its military wing, and were perpetrated by non-Iranian nationals. This has a very logical implication: in case the plot fails or the perpetrators are caught, Iran can distance itself from the attack. The main terrorist acts credited to Iran and Hezbollah are the U.S. Embassy and Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in 1983, the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the bombing of Israeli embassy and Jewish center in Buenos Aires in 1994 and the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia 1996, even if the last one is frequently credited to Al Qaeda.

Some foreign nationals, most of them Americans, have been kidnapped, held hostage or killed by Hezbollah.

All these characteristics also point to a last plot blamed on Iran which is not very convincing: the alleged plot by Manssor Arbabsiar, an American citizen of Iranian origin to kill the Saudi Ambassador in Washington with the help of the Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel. The plot looks too unusual when compared to other Iran-orchestrated plots.xxii

The last kind of attacks, overtly perpetrated by Iran, are the attacks against foreign embassies. The siege of the US Embassy in 1979 ended up in a well-known hostage crisis when 52 members of the US embassy staff were held hostage for 444 days and a recent one from November 2011 against the British embassy which ended up in the departure of the British from Iran and expelling the Iranian diplomatic staff from UK. Various protest activities take place in front of various embassies in Iran, for example against the Muhammad cartoons in 2006.xxiii Despite the propaganda, that these protests are spontaneous, they are organized and have the approval of the security forces.xxiv


Conclusion


The research on Iran is not an easy task and it becomes very particular if we consider the ideology of the ruling establishment. To understand it really deeply it is not enough to apply the general schemes and rules of foreign policy and behavior usually applicable to other countries. To understand Iran it is necessary to understand its deeply intricate and heterogeneous ideological and religious structure, the Shi’a theology and the sectarian pattern of the Middle East. It is also necessary to understand the role of each of its strategic allies or “foreign branches”, which have a religious implication as well. Iran, side by side with the interest for hegemony in the broader Middle East region, built on a deeply rooted complex and memory of the ancient Persian empire, pursues a proselytizing revolutionary agenda, which is in many aspects similar to other political or ideological movements, like revolutionary communism, or extreme right wing militarist regimes, who during the history tried to find like-minded governments, export their ideology and expand their influence in the neighboring countries, frequently sponsoring hostile groups and influential individuals to undermine the current governments and provoke coups to install a puppet or a friendly government. The obtaining of financial means to pursue this kind of expensive foreign policy is also an important chapter to consider, mainly in the light of the efforts to manipulate the global prices of crude oil, still the main revenue for the government, despite sanctions. It might be supposed, that many verbal threats by the government are just aimed at raising the crude prices.

Another chapter is the government’s effort to silence the domestic and exiled opposition and control tightly the population.

Unfortunately the small scale of this paper does not permit us to analyze deeper the whole issue, but in general it is possible to assess the Iranian policy as a covertly militarist and expansionist one from its very essence. The government of the Islamic Republic does not refrain from financing militant groups and organizations and using them to support their aims in their complex and intricate foreign policy.



i Bantekas, Illias, “The International Law of Terrorist Financing,” The American Journal of International Law , Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 315-333, Published by: American Society of International Law, accessed January 23, 2012. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3100109


ii “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Financing, Improving International Cooperation”, UN Press Release SC/7185, dated 28/09/2001, accessed January 23, 2012. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm


iii GARes. 49/60, Annex II, op. paras. 4, 5 (Dec. 9, 1994);

iv

“UN Action To Counter Terrorism”, UN website, accessed January 23, 2012. http://www.un.org/terrorism/securitycouncil.shtml

v

Hamid Tehrani, trans., Imam Khomeini (S.A.) on Exportation of Revolution. Tehran: International Affairs Department of the Institute for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini (S.A.), 2001.

vi

Ibidem p. 16-17

vii

Ibidem p. 19

viii

Ibidem p. 67

ix

Feldman, Noah, “Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age,” New York Times, October 29, 2006, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/29islam.html?pagewanted=all

x

“Qods (Jerusalem) Force; Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC – Pasdaran-e Inqilab)”, Global Security, last updated July 28 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/iran/qods.htm

xi

Slavin, Barbara, “Hyping the Threat from Iran,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 20, 2008, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/05/20/ED3R10MCVD.DTL

xii

Cordesman, Anthony H. and Seitz, Adam C. Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Reglional Nuclear Arms Race? Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. p. 85.

xiii

Wikipedia contributors, “Hezbollah Flag”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hezbollah_Flag.jpg

xiv

Wikipedia contributors, “IRGC-logo”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:IRGC-logo.JPG

xv

DoctorZin, “Hezbollah flag in the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Regime Change Iran blog, July 27, 2006, http://regimechangeiran.blogspot.com/2006/07/hezbollah-flag-in-parliament-of.html

xvi

Tisdall, Simon and foreign staff in Damascus, “Iran Helping Syrian Regime Crack Down on Protesters, Say Diplomats,” The Guardian, May 9, 2011, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/08/iran-helping-syrian-regime-protesters

xvii O’Leary, Carole A. and Heras, Nicholas A., “Shiite Proselytizing in Northeastern Syria Will Destabilize a Post-Assad Syria”, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 35, September 15, 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38401

xviii

“Badr Corps”, Global Security, last updated July 11 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/badr.htm

xix

“Mapping Militant Organizations; Mahdi Army”, Stanford University Project, last updated October 16, 2011, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/profiles/view/57

xx

“Turkey May Fund Hamas After Iran Shortages: Report.”, The World Bulletin, last modified January 29, 2012, accessed January 23, 2012, http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=84998

xxi

Kadivar, Cyrus, “Dialogue of Murder, a Cautionary Tale that Must not Be Forgotten” , The Iranian, January 26, 2003, accessed January 23,2012, http://www.iranian.com/CyrusKadivar/2003/January/Murder/6.html


xxii Hall, Eleanor, “ Ex-CIA Warns US ‘Dangerously Wrong’ on Iran, ABC News, updated October 12, 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-10-12/ex-cia-warns-us-dangerously-wrong-on-iran/3553704?section=world


xxiii “Danish Embassy in Tehran Attacked,” The Guardian, , last modified February 6, 2006, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/06/religion.uk1


xxiv “Attack on UK Embassy in Iran ‘had Support of the State’”, BBC News UK, last modified December 2011, accessed January 24, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16010547